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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

HAROLD EDWIN (HAL) RHODES,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

vs.

:

Case No. 89-0473-CA
Category 14b

JOHN M. FRY and
JUDITH L. FRY,
Defendants/Third-party
Plaintiffs/Appellants.

:

vs.

:

WILLIAM C. PETERSEN,

:

Third-party Defendant.

:

JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a final judgment in a civil case. The
Utah Supreme Court had jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
78-2-2(3) (j) (Supp. 1989).

The case was transferred to this Court

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (Supp. 1989) , and this Court
has jurisdiction pursuant to § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 1989).
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Did the trial court err in directing a verdict for the

plaintiff passenger, where the defendant had stipulated that the
plaintiff was not negligent, the trial

court had

previously

directed a verdict in favor of plaintiff's driver based on the
uncontroverted evidence, and the accident was not one which would
happen in the absence of negligence?

2.

If this Court determines that the trial court did err,

should this case be remanded for a new trial on negligence only
where the trial court determined that there was no substantial
competent evidence to support the jury's verdict, the overwhelming
weight of the evidence established that Fry was negligent, and the
jury was confused?
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-73 (1981), amended by Utah Code Ann. §
41-6-73 (1988), as in effect at the time of the accident, provided
as follows:
The driver of a vehicle intending to turn to
the left within an intersection or into an
alley, private road, or driveway shall yield
the right-of-way to any vehicle approaching
from the opposite direction which is within the
intersection or so close to the turning vehicle
as to constitute an immediate hazard.
The provisions of Rule 50 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
are set forth in the Appendix.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

This is a civil action to recover

for personal injuries incurred in an automobile accident alleged
to have been caused by defendants1 negligence.
B.

Course

of

Proceedings

and

Disposition

accident in question occurred on December 11, 1982.

Below.

The

(Tr.1 11-28-

^itations to those portions of the record which were repaginated by the trial court clerk in accordance with Rule 11(b) of the
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals will be to "R. [page number]."
2

88 p. 47.)

Plaintiff filed his complaint on August 12, 1983,

initially naming as defendants John M. Fry and his mother, Judith
L. Fry. The complaint alleged that John M. Fry (hereinafter "Fry")
negligently drove the pick-up he was driving into the path of the
automobile in which plaintiff was a passenger.

The complaint

further alleged that Judith L. Fry signed the driver's license
application of John M. Fry, who was a minor at the time of the
accident, and was accordingly liable for his negligence pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-10 (1981) , amended by Utah Code Ann. § 412-115 (1988) .
Defendants Fry subsequently filed a third-party complaint
naming William C. Petersen (hereinafter "Petersen"), the driver of
the automobile in which plaintiff was a passenger, as a third-party
defendant.

(R. 90-95.) Plaintiff thereafter amended his complaint

to also state a claim against Petersen for negligence.

(R. 142-

45.)
The case was tried before a jury commencing November 28, 1988.
(R. 374-86.)

Petersen reserved the right to make motions at the

close of plaintiff's case (Tr. 11-29-88 p. 102), and at the end of
Fry's case, (R. 500), and at an appropriate time made a motion for
directed verdict as against both plaintiff and Fry.

(Tr. 11-29-88

Only one portion of the transcript was so paginated, that of the
testimony of Dr. Rudolph Limpert on the second day of trial, November
29, 1988. The balance of the transcript will be cited by date and
page number, e.g., "Tr. 11-29-88 p.
."
3

p. 190.) After considering arguments of counsel, Petersen's motion
was granted.

(Id. p. 197.)

Plaintiff moved for a directed verdict that plaintiff had no
comparative negligence. All parties stipulated to the motion, and
it was granted.

(Id. p. 197.)

Plaintiff also made an oral motion for a directed verdict that
Fry was negligent.

(Id.) The motion was preliminarily denied (Id.

p. 198), and renewed the following morning in writing.
Tr. 11-30-88 p. 3.)

(R. 292;

After arguments, the trial court took the

motion under advisement.

(Tr. 11-30-88 p. 9.)

Fry requested, and the court rejected, a jury instruction on
"unavoidable accident."

(R. 324; Tr. 11-30-88 p. 46.)

The case

was submitted to the jury on a special verdict, but the jury was
instructed to answer questions relating to the amount of plaintiff's damages regardless of its verdict on negligence.

(Tr. 11-

30-88 p. 49.)
The jury found that Fry was not negligent.

(R. 303-04.)

The

trial court thereafter granted plaintiff's motion for a directed
verdict, which had been taken under advisement during the trial.
(R. 424-30.)

The trial court subsequently entered formal Findings

of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 448-54) , and a Judgment (R. 45556).

Fry filed his appeal on May 15, 1989.
C.

Statement of Facts.

(R. 457-58.)

The accident giving rise to this

action occurred shortly after 8:00 p.m. on December 11, 1982, at
the intersection of 1300 South and Main Street in Orem, Utah.

4

(Tr.

11-28-88 p. 47; Tr. 11-29-88 p. 8.)

The road on which both

vehicles were traveling, 1300 South, is the main arterial road
leading from the 1-15 freeway to the University Mall in Orem, Utah.
(A diagram of the intersection appears in the Appendix.) Plaintiff
was a passenger in a Volkswagen "bug" driven by William Petersen.
Petersen and plaintiff were on a double date; plaintiff and his
date were seated in the back seat, and Petersen and his date in the
front seat.

(Tr. 11-29-88 p. 6.)

The Volkswagen was proceeding

east along 1300 South at a speed less than the speed limit.2 There
was no evidence of any lane changes by the Volkswagen.
29-88 pp. 125, 133.

(Tr. 11-

See also Tr. 11-28-88 p. 64, Tr. 11-29-88 p.

29.) The Volkswagen was travelling in the right-hand (South) lane
of the road.

(Tr. 11-28-88 p. 58; tr. 11-29-88 p. 122.) The road

at that point had two east-bound lanes plus a left-turn lane.
(Exs. 1 & 10, copies in appendix; Tr. 11-30-88 pp. 16-17.)

The

roads were clear and dry, and although it was dark, the street
lights were on and visibility was clear.
33; Tr. 11-28-88 pp. 48-49.)
were on.

(Tr. 11-29-88 pp. 7, 32-

The headlights on the Volkswagen

(Tr. 11-29-88 pp. 24, 132, 140.)

2

Rudolph Limpert, who testified for Fry, estimated the speed of
the Volkswagen at 44 to 48 miles per hour prior to application of the
brakes, and 30 to 35 miles per hour at the point of impact. (R. 48788, 493.) Greg DuVal, who testified for plaintiff, estimated the
speed of the Volkswagen at 38 miles per hour prior to braking, and
25 miles per hour on impact. (Tr. 11-30-88 p. 26.) Petersen did
not recall what speed he was going. (Id. p. 36.) The speed limit
was 55 mph. (Tr. 11-28-88 p. 55.)
5

John M. Fry, 16 years old at the time of the accident, was
also on a date.

(Tr. 11-29-88 pp. 31-32.)

He thought he was on

the road to the Orem Recreation Center, but was about 17 blocks off
course.

(Tr. 11-28-88 p. 56.) His vehicle was proceeding west on

1300 South and turned left through the intersection and into the
path of the Volkswagen.

(Tr. 11-29-88 p. 123.)

The Volkswagen

left 35' 11" of skid marks in the right-hand travel lane (Tr. 1128-88 p. 55; Ex. 2 ) , but still collided with sufficient force to
cause the Volkswagen to spin around and to knock all four occupants
of the Volkswagen unconscious.

(Tr. 11-29-88 pp. 9, 56, 132.)

Only one of the four occupants in the Volkswagen had any memory of
the accident itself, and that was Becky Jones, Petersen's date.
Her only recollection was that she was turned around talking to
plaintiff and his date when she felt Petersen slam on his brakes.
She turned forward and saw the pick-up in front of the Volkswagen
just as the collision occurred.

(Tr. 11-29-88 pp. 131-32.)

Fry and his date similarly had little memory of the accident.
Fry testified (plaintiff disputed this testimony) that he had been
stopped at a red light prior to entering the intersection, and when
the light turned green, he looked for on-coming traffic, saw none,
and proceeded to make his turn.

(Tr. 11-29-88 p. 105.) He further

testified that his vision was obstructed by a brown station wagon
which was in the eastbound left turn lane and proceeding to turn
left.

(Id.)

He also testified, however, that after making his

initial visual check for on-coming vehicles and starting to make

6

his turn, he did not again look for traffic in the eastbound lanes.
Fry further acknowledged that his pickup sat "considerably higher
off the road11 than the station wagon.

(Tr. 11-29-88 P. 44.)

The impact occurred in the southern most lane when Fry was
nearly through the intersection (Tr. 11-29-88 p. Ill), a distance
of over 50 feet from where he began his turn (Tr. 11-30-88 p. 26) .3
It would have taken Fry approximately five to six seconds to travel
through the intersection.

(Tr. 11-29-88 p. 169.)

Fry nonetheless

unequivocally testified that he only looked for on-coming traffic
prior to starting his turn and did not look again at any point
during the turn.
Plaintiff

(Tr. 11-29-88 pp. 41, 46, 105.)

suffered

severe and permanent

injuries

in the

accident, and has a 15% permanent partial disability as a result
of the injuries.

(Tr. 11-28-88 p. 161.)

He has and continues to

experience considerable low back pain, with the result that he
cannot participate in sporting and other activities as he used to,
and is limited in his abilities to work and lift objects.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Accidents don't just happen.

They are either caused by cir-

cumstances beyond control of the individuals involved, i.e., they
are unavoidable accidents, or they are caused by the negligence of

3

This is not different from the testimony of Rudolph Limpert.
Dr. Limpert testified that the pick-up traveled approximately 28.5
feet from the moment that Petersen would have perceived the pick-up.
(R. 495.) Limpert gave no testimony concerning the total distance
that Fry traveled across the intersection.
7

one or more persons. The accident in this case does not fit within
the definition of "unavoidable accident" established by prior
decisions of the Utah Supreme Court.

It follows that the accident

was the result of the negligence of some person.

The trial court

held, based on the undisputed evidence, that neither plaintiff nor
Petersen, the driver of the automobile in which plaintiff was a
passenger, were negligent.

The only other potential cause of the

accident was the negligence of defendant Fry.

Having previously

held as a matter of law that neither plaintiff nor Petersen was
negligent, and where the accident was not unavoidable, the court
was required to direct a verdict of negligence against Fry.
The trial court was further, based on the evidence presented
at trial, required to direct a verdict of negligence against Fry.
Even viewed in the light most favorable to Fry, the evidence
established that Fry commenced a left turn in a very large intersection when he knew his vision of on-coming traffic was blocked,
and did not look for on-coming traffic except when he first
commenced his turn.

It was obvious that Peterson, who had the

right of way, had seen Fry, because he slammed on his brakes in an
attempt to avoid the accident.

Reasonable minds could not differ

in finding that Fry could have seen Peterson if he had looked, and
that Fry did not exercise the due care required by statute of an
individual making a left turn.
As an alternative, if this Court determines that the trial
court erred in granting a directed verdict, this case should be

8

remanded for a new trial on the issue of negligence only.

The

findings made by the trial court in granting plaintiff's Motion for
Directed Verdict establish that there was no substantial competent
evidence to support the verdict, it was contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence, and the jury was confused.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE ACCIDENT WAS NOT "UNAVOIDABLE," AND
HENCE WAS THE RESULT OF THE NEGLIGENCE OF
SOME PERSON.
Utah decisions have recognized a class of accidents which are
"unavoidable":
It is obvious that there are some accidents, i.e.,
unusual and unexpected occurrences, which result in
injury and which happen without any one failing to
exercise reasonable care; and when this is so the
accident is properly classified as unavoidable
insofar as legal causation or the imposition of
liability is concerned.
Woodhouse v. Johnson, 20 Utah 2d 210, 436 P.2d 442, 445 (1968)
(footnotes omitted).

The same concept has also been expressed as

follows:
If either party can avoid an accident by the
exercise of proper care, it cannot be said to
be unavoidable.
The issue of unavoidable
accident arises only where the evidence shows
that the accident happened from an unknown or
unforeseen cause or in an unexplainable manner
which circumstances rebut the defendant's
alleged negligence.
Strincrham v. Broderick, 529 P.2d 425, 426 (Utah 1974).

9

The converse of this concept is that other accidents (those
which are not unavoidable) are the result of the negligence of some
person.4

Application of this concept was illustrated

in the

Florida case of Davis v. Sobik's Sandwich Shops, Inc., 351 So. 2d
17 (Fla. 1977) . The plaintiff in that case, as in the instant one,
"was an innocent passenger, free of any contributory negligence."
351 So. 2d at 18. The court held that where there was no evidence
to indicate that the injury was the result of an unavoidable
accident, and where there was no evidence that the accident was
caused by anyone not joined in the action, the only possible
conclusion was that one or more of the defendants was at fault.
The court held that "the state of the evidence would require a new
trial if petitioner failed to recover against at least one of the

4

This assertion is not contrary to King v. Fereday, 739 P.2d 618

(Utah 1987), nor to McCloud v. Baum, 569 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1977), both

of which are cited on page 15 of Fry's brief for the proposition that
"a collision alone does not create an inference of negligence." The
plaintiff in King was injured when her car was rear-ended by the
defendant in heavy traffic. The plaintiff in McCloud was injured as
he was traveling straight through an intersection on his motorcycle
and was struck by the defendant's car, which came from the opposite
direction and was turning left. In each case, the plaintiff was
found to be 100% at fault. The cases stand only for the proposition
that an inference of negligence may not be based solely upon the
position or role of the drivers in the accident (i.e., the following
car in a rear-end collision is not always at fault, nor is the leftturning car in an intersection collision always at fault).
The
plaintiff in each case was clearly negligent, so the cases did not
address, and did not decide, the question of whether the mere
occurrence of a collision creates an inference that some person was
negligent, in absence of evidence that the collision was "unavoidable."
10

defendants. A verdict for all the defendants was legally precluded
by the evidence."

351 So. 2d at 18-19.

Each of these factors is present in the instant case.
accident was not unavoidable.

The

Fry's expert, Rudolph Limpert, did

characterize the accident as "unfortunate" (R. 497) , and did opine
that Fry had not done anything unreasonable, but that does not
establish that the accident was "unavoidable."

The "unfortunate"

circumstance identified by Dr. Limpert was that of the alleged
station wagon in the left hand turn lane opposite from Fry, and
which Fry claimed blocked his view of the Volkswagen. Having one's
view blocked by another vehicle when wanting to make a left hand
turn is certainly not a rare or uncommon occurrence. The accident
could have been avoided by Fry waiting until the station wagon
completed its turn before starting his turn, or by Fry continuing
to look for on-coming vehicles during the course of his turn. The
accident was not unavoidable as that term has been defined by the
Utah Supreme Court.
The instant case, therefore, presents a set of circumstances
different from the cases relied upon by Fry. The accident was not
unavoidable.

Fry stipulated that plaintiff was not negligent.

The trial court held, and Fry has not appealed that determination,
that Petersen was not negligent.

There was no claim that the

accident was caused by any other person.

The only possible

remaining conclusion is that the accident was caused by Fry.
trial court properly directed a verdict against Fry.

11

The

POINT II
THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL, COMPETENT EVIDENCE
TO SUPPORT A FINDING THAT FRY WAS NOT
NEGLIGENT.
The standard to be applied by this court in reviewing the
trial court's directed verdict is whether there was "substantial
competent evidence" which would have supported a jury verdict that
Fry was not negligent.

Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d

414, 418 (Utah 1989) (quoting In re Estate of Kesler, 701 P.2d 86,
95 (Utah 1985) ) .

See also First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v.

Banberry Crossing, 780 P.2d 1253, 1255 (Utah 1989).

"Substantial

evidence" has been defined as follows:
Substantial evidence is more than a mere
scintilla of evidence though something less
than the weight of the evidence. Substantial
evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion.
Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
No "substantial competent evidence" was presented

in the

instant case which would support a jury finding that Fry was not
negligent.

Although the evidence was conflicting in many par-

ticulars, certain facts were not disputed.

The night was clear,

the roads were dry, and, although it was night, the street lights
were on and visibility was clear.

The Volkswagen in which plain-

tiff was a passenger was in good operating condition, and its
headlights were on.

The Volkswagen had the right of way and was

12

traveling at a speed well below the posted speed limit.

The

Volkswagen was traveling in the center lane of the three eastbound
lanes and did not make any sudden lane changes immediately prior
to the collision.

In summary, there was absolutely no evidence,

and the trial court properly so held, of any negligence or improper
driving by Petersen, the driver of the car in which plaintiff was
a passenger.

Petersen had a right to be where he was and driving

in the manner he was at the time of the accident.
The evidence further established, without dispute, that Fry
did not have the right of way.

Fry intended to turn left across

three lanes of traffic in an area where the posted speed limit was
55 miles per hour. According to Fry's testimony, he looked for oncoming traffic while his own pickup was stopped for a red light,
but his view of on-coming traffic was at least partially obstructed
by a station wagon in the eastbound left-turn lane. When the light
turned green, Fry looked once, did not see any on-coming traffic,
and proceeded to turn.

He traveled approximately 56 feet, taking

approximately five to six seconds, before reaching the point of
impact. After his initial visual check prior to starting his turn,
he did not again even glance to see if there was any oncoming
traffic from the eastbound lanes.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-73 (1981), amended by Utah Code Ann. §
41-6-73 (1988), as in effect at the time of the accident, provided
as follows:
The driver of a vehicle intending to turn to
the left within an intersection or into an
13

alley, private road, or driveway shall yield
the right-of-way to any vehicle approaching
from the opposite direction which is within the
intersection or so close to the turning vehicle
as to constitute an immediate hazard.
Fry violated this section, and was therefore negligent.

Fry

acknowledges that there are prior Utah decisions where a plaintiff
has lost at trial against a left-turning driver, and has attempted
on appeal to establish that the left-turning driver was negligent
as a matter of law, and that the jury decisions have been affirmed.
In each of these cases, however, there was evidence that the
plaintiff was also negligent.

For example, in Smith v. Gallegos,

16 Utah 2d 344, 400 P.2d 570 (1965), Smith was a passenger in a
vehicle driven by Jones which turned left at an intersection into
the path of Gallegos, who was traveling straight through the
intersection.

Smith prevailed at trial, and Gallegos appealed,

claiming that Jones was contributorily negligent as a matter of law
because he had failed to yield the right of way. The Supreme Court
affirmed, holding that Jones was entitled to assume, in determining
whether an on-coming vehicle constituted an immediate hazard, that
other drivers were not negligent.

The evidence showed that

Gallegos was exceeding the speed limit, had accelerated just before
or while going through the intersection, and may have suddenly
switched lanes just before the intersection. The court, therefore,
held that there was some evidence to support the jury's verdict
that Jones was not negligent in failing to yield to Gallegos.

14

Of similar effect is Gibbons v. Orem City Corp., 27 Utah 2d
184, 493 P.2d 1280 (1972), which also involved the question of
whether a left-turning plaintiff was contributorily negligence as
a matter of law. The defendant in Gibbons was exceeding the speed
limit, and the court accordingly affirmed the jury verdict of no
contributory negligence.
Another example is McCloud v. Baum, 569 P. 2d 1125 (Utah 1977).
The plaintiff was traveling straight through the intersection and
was struck by a car turning left.
100% at fault.

The jury found the plaintiff

The evidence showed, however, that the plaintiff

was exceeding the speed limit and had swerved around a camper and
into the opposing traffic lane just before entering the intersection.
In each of the foregoing cases, the court has allowed the jury
to excuse the left-turning driver's failure to yield where the
driver with the right of way was guilty of some negligent or
improper conduct.
case.

No such circumstance existed in the instant

Where Petersen was not negligent, reasonable minds could

not differ on whether Fry negligently failed to yield the right of
way. To hold otherwise would be to hold that left-turning drivers
whose view of on-coming traffic is obscured may nonetheless forge
boldly ahead without regard to what perils may await.
Such a concept has been previously criticized and rejected by
the Utah Supreme Court under circumstances where the victim and the
victim's driver were not negligent. In French v. Utah Oil Refining
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Co, , 117 Utah 406, 216 P.2d 1002 (1950), for example, the plaintiff
turned left in an intersection in front of the defendant's truck.
The trial court directed a verdict that the plaintiff was contributor ily negligent for having failed to yield the right of way.
The Utah Supreme Court affirmed and stated as follows:
Regardless of his exact position, plaintiff saw
the truck some 120 feet away from him prior to
the time he entered the west lane of traffic
and never again noticed it until just prior to
the crash or until it was 6 feet from the point
of impact.
216 P.2d at 1003.
Several other decision have also considered and rejected the
contention that a driver may ignore hazards obscured by other
vehicles.

E.cr. , Richards v. Anderson, 9 Utah 2d 17, 337 P. 2d 59

(1959); Hughes v. Hooper, 19 Utah 2d 389, 431 P.3d 983 (1967).
When faced with the situation of a non-negligent victim and
a defendant who has violated the statute, the courts have not
hesitated to direct a verdict of negligence.

Henderson v. Meyer,

533 P.2d 290 (Utah 1975); Solt v. Godfrey, 25 Utah 2d 210, 479 P.2d
474 (1971).
By holding that Petersen was not negligent, the trial court
thereby held that he was doing what he had a right to do and was
where he had a right to be.

It follows that Fry had a duty to

yield to him, and was negligent, as a matter of law, for failing
to do so.
contrary.

There was no substantial competent evidence to the
This Court must affirm the directed verdict.
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POINT III
AS AN ALTERNATIVE, PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED
TO A REMAND FOR A NEW TRIAL ON NEGLIGENCE ONLY.
Plaintiff has established above that the judgment of the trial
court should be affirmed in all respects.

In the event, however,

that this Court determines to reverse the trial court's directed
verdict, this Court should remand for a new trial on negligence
only, or alternatively, remand it to allow the plaintiff to file
a motion for new trial to be considered by the trial court.
In connection with its granting of plaintiff's Motion for a
Directed Verdict, the trial court entered specific Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law. It is evident from those Findings that the
trial court concluded that the overwhelming weight of the evidence
showed that Fry was negligent, and that there was insufficient
evidence to justify a verdict for Fry.

Insufficiency of the

evidence to justify the verdict is grounds for a new trial.
R. Civ. P. 59(a)(6).

Utah

The trial court in essence concluded, as did

the Utah Supreme Court in Solt v. Godfrey, 25 Utah 2d 210, 479 P.2d
474 (1971), that "[u]nder the evidence given in this case, it is
difficult to see how the jury could have found for the defendant
unless they were misled by some instructions given by the Court."
479 P.2d at 476.
In the event that this Court determines to reverse the trial
court's directed verdict, therefore, this Court should remand this
case for a new trial on the negligence issues.
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A retrial on liability only is proper where, as in this case,
there is no claim of any error in the damage phase of the trial
and the issues of liability and damages were not intermingled.
Groen v. Tri-O-Inc. , 667 P.2d 598, 607 n.ll (Utah 1983).

See also

Annot. Grant of new trial on issue of liability alone without
retrial of issue of damages, 34 A.L.R. 2d 988 (1954).
It would follow, if retrial is on negligence only, that
interest on the judgment should continue to accrue, because the
amount of plaintiff's loss has now been fixed with mathematical
accuracy.

Joraensen v. John Clay & Co., 660 P.2d 229, 233 (Utah

1983) .
As an alterative, if this Court determines not to remand for
a new trial, the Court should nonetheless specifically state that
the trial court, on remand, may consider any motion for new trial
filed by plaintiff within ten days of entry of a judgment on the
original jury verdict.

Such a clarification is necessary because

of the unique procedural context in which the trial court granted
plaintiff's Motion for a Directed Verdict.
Plaintiff's Motion for a Directed Verdict was made pursuant
to Utah R. Civ. P. 50(a).
in the Appendix.)

(The full text of Rule 50 is reproduced

Plaintiff made his motion at the close of Fry's

evidence, and the court took the motion under advisement.

Sub-

division (b) of Rule 50 contemplates that where a motion for a
directed verdict is made and not granted, and the jury thereafter
renders a verdict adverse to the moving party, the moving party may
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then file a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and
may include an alternative motion for new trial. The rule further
provides that the trial court may grant the judgment notwithstanding the verdict and also make a conditional ruling on the
motion

for new trial, which ruling becomes operative

if the

judgment notwithstanding the verdict is reversed on appeal.

Utah

R. Civ. P. 50(c).
Plaintiff did not follow this procedure in the instant case,
however, because no judgment on the verdict was ever entered.

A

motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict must be made within
"ten days after entry of judgment."

Utah R. Civ. P. 50(b).

No

judgment adverse to plaintiff was entered in this case, and there
was, therefore, no point at which plaintiff could properly have
made a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and an
alternative motion for new trial.
In the event this Court reverses the trial court's judgment
and does not remand for a new trial, this Court should at least
specifically state that the plaintiff may make a motion for new
trial within ten days after entry of the judgment on the verdict.
CONCLUSION
There was no substantial competent evidence to support the
jury verdict in favor of Fry, and the trial court properly directed
a verdict and entered a judgment for plaintiff.
should be affirmed in all respects.
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The judgment

If this Court does not affirm the judgment, the case should
be remanded for a new trial on negligence only, with interest to
accrue on the judgment pending retrial. Alternatively, this Court
should remand with directions that the plaintiff may file a motion
for new trial within ten days after entry of the judgment on the
jury verdict.
DATED this 16th day of February, 1990.

F&ED D./MOW7ARD and
"^
for:
/LESLI^/W. sSLAUGH,
:
HOWARt), LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the
foregoing were mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this 16th
day of February, 1990.
Scott W. Christensen, Esq.
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH
4 Triad Center, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180
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APPENDIX "A"

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

ms L
FRED D. HOWARD (1547), fon
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345
Facsimile: (802) 377-4991

Q:Rhod-FOF.lo
Our File No. 14,608

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

HAROLD EDWIN (HAL) RHODES,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.

JOHN M. FRY and JUDITH L. FRY,
Defendants and
Third-Party Plaintiffs,
Civil No. 64,555

vs.

WILLIAM C PETERSEN,
Judge Boyd L. Park
Third-Party Defendant.

This matter having come on regularly for hearing before the Court sitting with
a jury on November 28-30, 1988, and after a good faith presentation of the available
evidence by both the plaintiff

and the defendants; and the Court having heard the

Motion of plaintiff's counsel for a directed verdict and having thereafter

received

memoranda of points and authorities by the respective attorneys in support of and in

opposition to said Motion, and the jury having heretofore resolved the question of
damages regarding plaintiff's injuries herein, and the Court having taken said Motion
under advisement, and thereafter having heard oral arguments regarding said Motion,
and being fully advised in the premises, the Court concludes that all the evidence
showed defendant William C. Peterson was not negligent and that John M. Fry was
negligent; and does, therefore, grant Plaintiff's Motion for Directed Verdict; and it
does now make and enter the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On or about December 11, 1982, the defendant John M. Fry was driving

a 1979 Chevrolet CIO pickup truck which was involved in a collision with a 1966 twodoor Volkswagen driven by third-party defendant William C. Petersen.

The accident

occurred at the intersection of State Road 265 and Main Street in Orem, Utah at
approximately 6:22 p.m. The intersection was regulated by traffic lights.
2.

The plaintiff Harold Edwin Rhodes was a passenger in the vehicle driven

by third-party defendant William C. Petersen.

Upon impact, the occupants of the

Petersen vehicle were all rendered unconscious from the accident and have limited
memory of the circumstances occurring at the time of the accident.
3.

Prior to the collision, the Fry vehicle was traveling westbound on State

Road 265, and the Petersen vehicle was travelling eastbound.

Defendant Fry testified

that he brought his vehicle to a stop at the intersection while he faced a red light.
When the light turned green, he perceived a station wagon approaching that was going
to make a left turn.

Defendant Fry stated he did not see the Petersen vehicle and,

therefore, proceeded to turn to the left across the eastbound lane of travel of the
2

Petersen vehicle.

In an attempt to avoid defendant Fry's vehicle as it turned in front

of Petersen's vehicle, Petersen applied the brakes and his vehicle laid down 35 feet 11
inches of tire skid marks before the point of impact between the two vehicles.

(See

Exhibits 2 and 10.)
4.

The Court finds from the testimonies of the investigating officer, Fran

Fillmore, and accident ^constructionists, Newell Knight and Greg DuVal, that defendant Fry was negligent.
5.

John M. Fry's expert accident reconstructionist, Rudolph Limpert, stated

on direct examination when asked: "Based on your experience in accident investigation
and reconstruction, what caused this accident?":

A set of unfortunate circumstances, a vehicle driving
behind a station wagon, a large domestic or American
station wagon that's some distance behind.
One could
calculate how small that Volkswagen is in relationship to
the perspective of that big car, the station wagon
obstructing its view. And then the unfortunate accident
"occurred. So I don't see anything unreasonable in terms
of the left turn by Mr. Fry when he made the left turn.

(Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings, Testimony of Rudolph Limpert, November 29,
1988, 2:10 p.m. transcribed p. 30.)
6.

The Court notes that the jury by Special Verdict found defendant John

M. Fry not negligent.

The jury finding, together with the Court's instruction to the

jury, that the plaintiff was not negligent as stipulated by the parties and further, that
the Court had found as a matter of law defendant Petersen was not negligent, resulted
in what would have to be termed an unavoidable accident.
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The Court had refused to

give an unavoidable accident instruction.

The jury further found plaintiff Harold E.

Rhodes incurred $21,000.00 in special damages and $29,000.00 in general damages.
7.

Utah Code Ann., § 41-6-73, which was submitted as Jury Instruction No.

23, states:
The operator of a vehicle intending to turn to the left
shall yield the right-of-way to any vehicle approaching
from the opposite direction which is so close to the
turning vehicle as to constitute an immediate hazard.
8.

This Court finds that Utah Code Ann., § 41-6-73, is applicable to the

case at bar and creates a statutory duty on all operators of motor vehicles who make
left hand turns to ". . . yield the right-of-way to any vehicle approaching from the
opposite direction which is so close to the turning vehicle as to constitute an immediate hazard."
9.

This Court also follows the ruling in French v. Utah Oil Ref. Co.. 117

Utah 406, 216 P.2d 1002, 1004 (1950) wherein the Utah Supreme Court held:
. . . a burden is placed on the driving making the turn as
he has control of the situation, and if there is a reasonable probability that the movement cannot be made in
safety then the disfavored driver should yield. The driver
proceeding straight ahead has little opportunity to know a
vehicle is to be turned across his path until the movement
is commenced and in many instances, the warning is too
late for the latter driver to take effective action.

10.

The Court also adheres to the rationale of Yeates v. Budge. 122 Utah

518, 252 P.2d 220 (1953) wherein the Utah Supreme Court held that where a defendant
attempted to turn across the path of the plaintiff, when he was only 40 feet away, the
trial court could reasonably conclude that the plaintiff was so close as to constitute an
4

immediate hazard and that the defendant should have yielded the right-of-way to him.
11.

This Court is reluctant to take from the jury its fact finding respon-

sibility regarding negligence of the parties and whether the negligence was a proximate
cause of plaintiff's injuries. The Court is mindful of those cases in which the Supreme
Court has concluded that juries should be fact finders. (Mel Hardman Productions. Inc.
v. Robinson. 604 P.2d 913, 917 (Utah 1979).)
12.

The Court, however, given all the testimony of the witnesses, finds that

the matter is one in which reasonable minds could not differ, and in fairness and
equity, cannot find that this accident was an unavoidable accident. The Utah Supreme
Court has defined an unavoidable accident as *\ . . an unusual and unexpected occurrence 'which resultfs] in injury and which happen[s] without anyone failing to exercise
reasonable care . . ." (Kusv v. K-Mart Apparel Fashion Corporation. 681 P.2d 1232, 1237
(Utah 1984); and Stringham v. Broderick. 529 P1.2d 425, 426 (Utah 1974).
13.

Even should this Court ignore the testimony of those witnesses who

testified that defendant Fry was negligent and look only to the testimony of Fry's
witness, Rudy Limpert, (according to his calculations this was an unfortunate accident),
this Court is of the opinion that the accident was not an unavoidable accident as
defined by the Supreme Court of this state,
14.

The Court finds that given all the evidence reasonable men could not

differ in finding that the defendant John M. Fry made a left hand turn across oncoming traffic heading eastbound along State Road 265 and did not keep a proper
lookout for eastbound on-coming traffic which resulted in his colliding with third-party
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defendant William C. Petersen's vehicle, thus violating his statutory duty pursuant to
Utah Code Ann., § 41-6-73.
15.

The Court also finds that the jury was confused in its application of the

jury instructions to the facts of the case by essentially concluding the collision to be
an unavoidable accident.
16.

The Court further finds that plaintiff Harold Edwin Rhodes is entitled to

his directed verdict against defendants holding that defendant John M. Fry negligently
operated his vehicle which was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries.
17.

The Court finds that at the time of the accident, December 11, 1982,

John M. Fry was the operator of a vehicle as a minor under 18 years of age; and this
his mother, Judith L. Fry, signed John M Fry's driver's license application.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and enters the
following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Court concludes that the plaintiff Harold Edwin (Hal) Rhodes was

not negligent.
2.

The Court concludes that the third-party defendant William C. Petersen

was not negligent.
3.

The Court concludes that reasonable minds could not differ regarding the

liability of the defendant and third-party plaintiff John M. Fry and concludes the same
to be negligent and that said negligence was the proximate cause of the accident in
question and of plaintiff's injuries.
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4.

The Court concludes that by law, liability of John M Fry is imputed to

defendant and third-party plaintifff Judity L. Fry under Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-115(2).
5.

The Court concludes that plaintiff is entitled to a judgment against

defendants John M. Fry and Judith L. Fry in the amount of $21,000.00 for special
damages, together with accrued interest on said special damages from the date of the
subject accident, December 11, 1982, until the date of judgment, at the rate of eight
percent (8%), and for general damages in the amount of $29,000.00, with interest to
accrue on the total judgment at the rate of twelve percent per annum (12%), plus court
costs thereafter.
DATED this

/

day of Ap*t£ 1989.
BY THE COURT

BOYD L. PARK
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to
the following, postage prepaid, this _ $ L d a y of April, 1989.
Scott W. Christensen, Esq.
Hanson, Epperson & Smith
P. O. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2970

R. Phil Ivie, Esq.
Ivie & Young
P. O. Box 672
Provo, UT 84603

^ShcMlXbJl
SECRETARY
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APPENDIX "B"

Judgment

|QCq }.-y--

FRED D. HOWARD (1547), for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345
Facsimile: (802) 377-4991

Q:Rhod-Jud.lo
Our File No. 14,608

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
HAROLD EDWIN (HAL) RHODES,
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT

vs.

JOHN M. FRY and JUDITH L. FRY,
Defendants and
Third-Party Plaintiffs,
Civil No. 64,555

vs.

WILLIAM C. PETERSEN,
Judge Boyd L. Park
Third-Party Defendant.
This matter having come on regularly for hearing before the Court sitting with
a jury on November 28-30, 1988, and the Court having heard the Motion of plaintiff's
counsel for a directed verdict and having granted the same by reason of the evidence
presented, and the jury having heretofore resolved the question of damages regarding
plaintiff's injuries herein, and after good faith presentation of the evidence by both
plaintiff and defendant, being fully advised in the premises, and having heretofore

entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; the Court does now make and
enter the following Judgment against defendants John M Fry and Judith L. Fry:
JUDGMENT
The Court concludes that plaintiff is entitled to a judgment against defendants
John M. Fry and Judith L. Fry in the amount of $21,000.00 for special damages,
together with accrued interest on said special damages from the date of the subject
accident, December 11, 1982, until the date of judgment, at the rate of eight percent
(8%), and for general damages in the amount of $29,000.00, with interest to accrue on
the total judgment at the rate of twelve percent per annum (12%), plus court costs
thereafter.

A

DATED this J^ day of

>fef
/

_, 1989.
BY THE COURT

BOYS' L. PARK
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to
the following, postage prepaid, this
Scott W. Christensen, Esq.
Hanson, Epperson & Smith
P. O. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2970

/

day of

, 1989.
R. Phil Ivie, Esq.
Ivie & Young
P. O. Box 672
Provo, UT 84603
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APPENDIX "C"

Diagrams of accident scene
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EXPLANATION OF ACCIDENT SCENE DIAGRAMS
The scale on the initial drawings was 1" = 1 0 ' . The scale on
these reductions is approximately 1" = 3 3 ' .
Exhibit 1 shows the resting place of the vehicles after the
accident.

"F" indicates Fry's pickup and

"P" indicates the

Petersen Volkswagen. (Tr. 11-28-88 p. 50.)
Exhibit 10 shows the probable path of travel of the vehicles
leading to the collision.
(Tr. 11-29-88 p. 165.)

"POI" indicates the point of impact.

The heavy black line from the cross-walk

to the point of impact indicates the approximate length of the skid
marks.

(Id. p. 165.)

The ".96" reflects the testimony of Newell

Knight of the travel time of the Volkswagen while laying down the
skid marks.
"1.5")

(Id.) The remainder of the heavy black line (next to

reflects

Mr.

Knight's

testimony

of

the

distance

the

Volkswagen traveled from the point of perception of the Fry vehicle
to the application of the brakes (i.e., the reaction time).
at 177.)
The wavy line is an error.

fid, at 177-78.)

(Id.

APPENDIX "D"

Utah R. C i v . P.

50.

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 50

Rule 50, Motion for a directed verdict and for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict.
(a) Motion for directed verdict; when made; effect. A party who moves
for a directed verdict at the close of the evidence offered by an opponent may
offer evidence in the event that the motion is not granted, without having
reserved the right so to do and to the same extent as if the motion had not
been made. A motion for a directed verdict which is not granted is not a
waiver of trial by jury even though all parties to the action have moved for
directed verdicts. A motion for a directed verdict shall state the specific
ground(s) therefor. The order of the court granting a motion for a directed
verdict is effective without any assent of the jury.
fb) Motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Whenever a motion for a directed verdict made at the close of all the evidence is denied or for
any reason is not granted, the court is deemed to have submitted the action to
the jury subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised "by the
motion. Not later than ten days after entry of judgment, a party who has
moved for a directed verdict may move to have the verdict and amy judgment
entered thereon set aside and to have judgment entered in accordance with his
motion for a directed verdict; or if a verdict was not returned such party,
within ten days after the jury has been discharged, may move for judgment in
accordance with his motion for a directed verdict. A motion for a new trial
may be joined with this motion, or a new trial may be prayed for in the
alternative. If a verdict was returned the court may allow the judgment to
stand or may reopen the judgment and either order a new trial or direct the
entry of judgment as if the requested verdict had been directed. If no verdict
was returned the court may direct the entry of judgment as if the requested
verdict had been directed or may order a new trial.
(c) Same: Conditional rulings on grant of motion.
(1) If the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, provided
for in Subdivision (b) of this rule, is granted, the court shall also rule on
the motion for a new trial, if any, by determining whether it should be
granted" if the judgment is thereafter vacated or reversed, and shall specify the grounds for granting or denying the motion for a new trial. If the
motion for a new trial is thus conditionally granted, the order thereon
does not affect the finality of the judgment. In case the motion for a new
trial has been conditionally granted and the judgment is reversed on
appeal, the new trial shall proceed unless the appellate court has otherwise ordered. In case the motion for a new trial has been conditionally
denied, the respondent on appeal may assert error in that denial; and if
the judgment is reversed on appeal, subsequent proceedings shall be in
accordance with the order of the appellate court.
(2) The party whose verdict has been set aside on motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict may serve a motion for a new trial pursuant
to Rule 59 not later than ten days after entry of the judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
(d) Same: Denial of motion. If the motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict is denied, the party who prevailed on that motion may, as respondent, assert grounds entitling him to a new trial in the event the appellate
court concludes that the trial court erred in denying the motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict If the appellate court reverses the judgment,
nothing in this rule precludes it from determining that the respondent is
entitled to a new trial, orfiromdirecting the trial court to determine whether a
new trial shall be granted.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is identical
to Rule 50, F.R.C.P.

